Power Electromagnetics (HPEM) for causing intentional interference in military targets such as C 4 I (Command, Control, Communication, Computer and Intelligence) targets and segments of civilian systems like critical VSAT's (Very Small Aperture Terminals), power grid and communication network, weather and air-traffic control radars etc. HPEM essentially consists of generation of intense electromagnetic waves either as High Power Microwave (HPM) or Ultra Wide Band (UWB) waves to cause electromagnetic interference. High power UWB electromagnetic waves are promising candidate for IEMI application. One such UWB source, developed for the purpose of radiating high intensity, fast rise time, short pulses, is the Half Impulse Radiating Antenna (HIRA) system, which covers a frequency range from 100 MHz to 6 GHz. In this paper, radiation characteristics of UWB source like electric field in both boresight and off-boresight, far field boundary and radiation pattern were studied. The UWB pulse dispersion through civil infrastructure and their coupling to power cables were studied computationally and validated experimentally.
INTRODUCTION
Modern civil and military infrastructures use electronic systems in large scale for various applications. While this dependence results in improved quality of service, it comes at the price of increased vulnerability to a wide variety of threats to the society's infrastructure. Electromagnetic threats are considered among those potential threats to the electronic devices because of miniaturisation of electronic components and their lower operating voltages and power. Therefore, it is essential to identify such potential threats in their deployment scenarios in order to harden the electronic system and prevent disruption in the functioning of electronic systems [1] .
HPEM technology uses devices that can generate transient electromagnetic (EM) environments where the peak electric and magnetic fields have high intensities. The act of deliberately disturbing electronic devices using such a technology is known as Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI). HPEM systems use special electrical equipments and antenna, which transforms battery power, or powerful chemical reaction or explosive energy into intense microwaves or UWB pulses, which can couple to electronic systems and damage them. IEMI is also similar to HEMP (High altitude Electromagnetic Pulse), without involving a nuclear burst, except that it has a very limited spatial region coverage, and a very narrow time domain waveform characteristics. Thereby, the difference between an IEMI attack and an accident involving an HPEM source is only the human intent [2] . An official definition for IEMI is "intentional malicious generation of electromagnetic energy introducing noise or signals into electric and electronic systems, thus disrupting, confusing or damaging these systems for terrorist or criminal purposes" [3] .
EM signals operating in the frequency range of 200 MHz to 5 GHz can cause transient upset to electronic systems because typical apertures that provide a path for coupling through various points of entries for energy propagation inside a physical body that may be resonating in this frequency range. Based on the present available technology, narrowband and ultra-wideband are the two time domain waveforms, which can be realised to form an IEMI attack on electronic system. HPEM environments are classified into four frequency bands based on the frequency content of their spectral densities, and they are [4] : "narrowband," "moderate band," "ultra-moderate band" and "hyperband". This paper deals with the study of UWB fields from hyperband radiator and its coupling to the cables and electronic systems.
Applications of HPEM can be marked in the areas of Military, Ground Penetrating Radars, food processing industries, electroforming industries, medical field such as X-ray imaging, military medicine [5] , detonation of Mines and IED (Improvised explosive device) from a safe distance in Military warfare [6] . The paper is organised as follows: (1) the IEMI source (HIRA) has been characterized, (2) the far field boundary of the HIRA was experimentally determined, (3) the effect of civil structures on pulse propagation has been studied, (4) the field to cable coupling studies was carried out in a utility building.
HIRA
Hyperband radiators have percentage bandwidth greater than 163.4% and operate from 10's of MHz to several GHz. They can be employed as high power, broadband jammers for disrupting the critical military and civilian electronic systems [7] . Hyperband radiator used is a Half Impulse Radiating Antenna (HIRA), which is non-dispersive with a planar phase front [8] . HIRA is a time domain antenna radiating short pulses of a few nanoseconds duration.
Components
HIRA180 manufactured by Montena Company was used for IEMI study as shown in Figure 1(a) . The geometrical specifications of HIRA are mentioned in Table 1 . [9] . In far field, output radiated pulse is the time derivative of input excitation signal which is an impulse. Prior to the impulse, a low amplitude prepulse is radiated from feed point. Impulse waveform is succeeded by a postpulse, mainly produced through the diffraction effects from feed arm edges and reflector rim as shown in Figure 1(b) . Mathematical expression for radiated field on boresight is given by [10] Equation (1) 
SOURCE CHARACTERIZATION
Source characterization involves study of parameters of radiated electric field pulse in different directions from antenna and variation of radiation pattern at different frequencies [10] .
Experimental Setup
The characteristics of time domain radiation are studied experimentally, at distances ranging from 2 m to 13 m as shown in Figure 1 (a). The high voltage pulser drives the antenna with Gaussian pulses of 0.1 ns rise time and 9.6 kV peak amplitude. The derivative output of D-dot sensor is integrated, and offset is compensated to obtain the original radiated E-field, shown in Figure 1 (b) [11] . From Table 2 , some observations can be drawn. For example, the response time gets poorer, and peak amplitude decreases as distance from boresight increases. The radiated pulse also gets expanded in time, as it loses many high frequency components on various off-boresight. 
On and Off Axis Measurements

CST Model
In order to study the radiation pattern of the HIRA, a CST Microwave Studio [12] tool has been used. For this purpose, a HIRA model, as shown in Figure 3 (a), has been prepared, and its radiated field on the boresight has been computed and experimentally verified by the in site measurement as shown in Figure 3 (b). Once the model has been verified, the radiation patterns are computed at various frequencies of the excitation pulse. The excitation signal is approximated to a double exponential pulse with a rise time of 0.1 ns and a peak voltage of 9.6 kV replicating pulser output voltage.
At lower frequencies such as 340 MHz and 640 MHz, the current distribution on the antenna feed arms is almost uniform, because of large wavelengths as compared to the physical size of feed arms; therefore, the radiation pattern assumes cardioid shape shown in Figure 4 (a) and Figure 4(b) . As the frequency increases, the antenna assumes its directive property, shown in Figure 4 (c) and Figure 4(d) . The antenna parameters are shown in Table 3 .
FAR FIELD CHARACTERIZATION
Far field of an antenna is a frequency domain concept. For time domain antenna like HIRA, the far-field boundary can be empirically computed based on the rise time and reflector diameter [13] . However, as per the data sheet of Montena HIRA180, measurements have shown that the far-field condition is also achieved for shorter distances. Therefore, the far-field boundary of HIRA is determined experimentally by using the established frequency domain criteria [14] . 
Measurement of Fields in Frequency Domain
Experimental setup consists of a signal generator connected to the Log Periodic Dipole Antenna (LPDA) with help of power amplifier. A 3-axis isotropic field probe is used to measure the E r , E φ and E θ components of electric field as shown in Figure 5 . LPDA operating in far-field region is excited with frequencies ranging from 200 MHz to 1.5 GHz, i.e., frequencies present in the frequency spectrum of the HIRA.
Determination of Far Field Distance
In classical theory [14] of far-field boundary, E θ will be a dominating component as compared to other two components E φ and E r of the field. Therefore, the measured E r and E φ field components are normalized to E θ for quantifying the E r and E φ contributions in the total field. The 4th degree polynomial fit is applied to the measured field data to form the limit lines for the E r and E φ field components in the far-field region as shown in Figure 6 (a) and Figure 6 (b). The validated CST HIRA 180 model was used to compute normalized frequency domain field data in boresight at various distances in boresight in frequency domain from 200 MHz to 1.5 GHz, and they are plotted against the measured far-field limit lines as shown in Figure 6 (c) and Figure 6 (d). It can be seen from the figures that E r component of the field exceeds its limit line above 1.35 GHz, while below 1.35 GHz it is well below the limit line. Similarly, E φ component of the field exceeds its limit line up to 9 meters. At a distance of 10 m and above both the electric field components are equal to or below their respective limit line. Therefore, from this experimental and computational study, 10 m is found to be the far-field boundary of HIRA UWB system considered in this paper. 
PULSE DISPERSION
Due to penetration capabilities of UWB pulses through different types of materials, front door and back door couplings are possible to various utility buildings and electronic systems [15] . The responses of building to UWB fields are vital to provide an estimated level of protection [16] .
Measurement of Dispersed Electric Fields
The UWB pulse is made to propagate through a utility building made of typical building materials, and the fidelity of the dispersed pulse to the free space radiation was assessed [17] . The experimental setup consists of HIRA located outside the utility building and D-dot sensor connected to a digital storage oscilloscope (DSO) placed inside the building as shown in Figure 7 (a). At a distance of 3 m, the E θ component which has undergone dispersion from wall was measured using a D-dot sensor as shown in Figure 7 (b). The same procedure was also repeated for pillar and window. The level of attenuation offered by the three dispersive media relative to free space medium can be observed from the peak amplitude levels of the measured pulse as shown in Table 4 . The thickness of the pillar was more than that of window and wall, so it offers attenuation to a greater extent. The window consists of iron grills making it possible to provide better attenuation but significant distortion to the UWB pulse. The spectrum of dispersed fields is shown in Figure 7(c) . From the corresponding spectrums, the shielding effectiveness of three media at different frequencies is shown in Table 5 . 
FIELD TO CABLE COUPLING
The radiated fields from IEMI source (HIRA 180) can couple to power cables inside a utility building, which in turn induces the voltage and currents in the entire cable systems. These transient voltages and currents can upset the connected sensitive electronic systems and at times, damage the front-end power supplies [18] . There are three popular transmission line models which are [19] (1) Taylor's model (2) Agarwal model (3) Rachidi model. These models are widely used to compute the induced voltage and currents in the load connected to the cable system. The main assumptions of transmission line approach are as follows:
• Propagation occurs along the line axis.
• The sum of the line currents at any cross section of the line is zero. In other words, the groundthe reference conductor -is the return path for the currents in the overhead conductors.
• The response of the line to the coupled electromagnetic fields is quasi-transverse electromagnetic.
Measurement of Common Mode Responses to Coupling of Dispersed Fields
The experimental setup consists of HIRA placed at a distance of 2 m from the power cable of 10 m length. One end of the power cable is connected to 230 V, 50 Hz AC power supply, and the other end is connected to load of 150 Ω. The dispersed fields from the constituents of unprotected utility building will superimpose common mode (CM) currents onto the differential mode currents [20] . The orientation of the cable with reference to ground or plane of polarization of HIRA determines the amount of power coupled to the cable from radiated electromagnetic fields. Thereby, maximum coupling condition arises when cable is placed vertical to the ground such that electric field vector from antenna is parallel to it as shown in Figure 8(a) . When the cable is placed horizontal to the ground plane, the electric field from HIRA is perpendicular to the cable that causes the minimum coupling case.
CM currents in two conductors of the cable were measured at the load ends using a current probe in both maximum and minimum coupling cases. The probe used was a 7427 model from Pearson electronics with a transfer impedance of 0.01 V/A. Similarly, CM voltages induced at the load ends were measured using BNC probes as shown in Figure 8(b) . These induced responses travel towards the load end and gets reflected due to impedance mismatch. The reflected waves travel back and forth until the energy reaches zero, which can be observed from the Figures 9 and 10. 
Measurement of Induced Transients
A transient voltage superimposed onto high frequency signals of digital circuits can cause undesired effects. It is possible to have transients on DC voltages obtained from switched mode power supply (SMPS) output, which converts the infected AC voltages with transient voltages as shown in Figure 11 . For lower conversion DC voltage levels, vulnerability of devices will increase due to high peak voltages of transients as observed in Figure 12. 
MITIGATION MEASURES
Due to the lack of available empirical data, generally there are few assumptions considered for the mitigation effectiveness because electromagnetic pulse testing on large infrastructure systems, subsystems, and communications has effects of destructive nature [21] . In consequence, only a few mitigation measures were in practice, due to sparse availability of empirical data. Properly designed and installed metallic shieldings and Faraday cages can be employed to protect vulnerable electrical assets. This is generally not an approach that fits most civil infrastructures. For instance, a power system includes generation stations, transmission lines, substations, and distribution infrastructure. There is no practical way to completely shield such a geographically dispersed system. Mitigation of such a complex system must utilize measures such as redundancy and critical subsystem resistance to minimize damage and downtime to the overall system functionality.
CONCLUSION
From various experimental results, it is evident that IEMI may be a potential threat to power utility system and building encasing the unprotected electronic systems. Radiated fields of HIRA were studied along with characterization of its far field using computational and experimental methods. Further dispersion of UWB pulse due to utility building was studied experimentally. HIRA was used to create an IEMI environment inside a utility building through the wall penetrating capabilities of UWB source. In effect, field to cable coupling phenomenon takes place, and responses such as induced voltages and currents were measured at load terminals.
